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A B S T R A C T
The ‘Peace versus justice’ debate has been a central theme when analyzing the politics of
international criminal justice. The role of the permanent International Criminal Court may be
portrayed as an obstacle to peace processes but it may as well facilitate those processes. The
present paper, by juxtaposing sometimes diverging views, argues that a more nuanced approach
is needed for properly assessing the impact of the ICC. In fact, the Court may play neither role
exclusively. Instead, there are diﬀerent mechanisms enshrined in the Rome Statute, for
accommodating the demands of peace and justice. They are addressed within the present study.
1. The problem
There exist a variety of possible relationships between peace and justice. When considering the troubled interrelationship, one
may start with the famous rule: Fiat iustitia pereat mundus. But the traditional understanding of delivering justice at all costs (“even
if the world should perish”) refers to the ideal. The spectrum of possible scenarios may be extended from the two values being
mutually exclusive to “no peace without justice” formula at the other end of the scale.
The aim of the present contribution is to sketch the problems underlying the presented interrelationship from the perspective of
international law, and, more precisely, that of international criminal law and to pay particular attention to the International Criminal
Court facing the conundrum deﬁned above.
In most general terms, the goals of international law (peace and security for collective groups, nations states and peoples) can
only be realized through the prosecution of particular individuals (Ohlin, 2009, p. 191). As famously stated by the International
Military Tribunal, “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced” (International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg), 1947, p. 221). The experience of both Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals is of course quite telling, but when
taking it into consideration one has to be aware of its limited value for the present examination. Both Tribunals indeed delivered
“victor's justice” in the aftermath of the World War II. Their paradigm, which precluded any need to balance the demands of peace
and justice, may thus only partly be applicable within this study.
From a slightly diﬀerent perspective, punishing the individual perpetrators and rehabilitating the individual victims, and thereby
avoiding collective guilt and collective myths of victimhood and eliminating the strife for vengeance, all contribute to the so-called
pacifying eﬀect of international criminal justice. They altogether strengthen the culture of peaceful settlement of conﬂicts (Nitsche,
2007, p. 303). Such an approach integrates, rather than counterbalances the values in question. To some extent this is also reﬂected
by the former Deputy ICT Prosecutor when noting that “the ICTY is essentially an instrument of peace: the criminal prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law is regarded as being central to the peace process in the
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former Yugoslavia. The same is true of the ICTR in Rwanda” (Blewitt, 2006, p. 146).
In a similar vein, one may use another formula “no peace without justice” to address the interplay and to present the two values
in question. But this is deﬁnitely not the only possible option – to mention now more confrontational versions. For example, Payam
Akhavan famously distinguished between “judicial romanticism” blindly pursuing justice and cynical “political realism” seeking
peace by appeasing the powerful (Akhavan, 2009, pp. 624ﬀ.). There are, then, diﬀerent stages for addressing the issue. In a
document prepared for the Review Conference in Kampala entitled “Managing the Challenges of Integrating Justice Eﬀorts and
Peace Processes” Priscilla Hayner identiﬁed diﬀerent sets of challenges concerning the relations between justice and peace processes:
1. negotiating justice (how accountability for serious crimes might be addressed in the course of peace negotiations), 2. the impact of
international justice (how international criminal justice eﬀorts may aﬀect ongoing (or intended) peace talks), and 3. the
implementation of justice (in the aftermath of the peace agreement where there is still strong resistance to accountability)
(Hayner, 2010). It is the ﬁrst two layers that are mainly addressed here.
The dichotomous vision of the titular dilemma is also shared by the Truth And Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone:
“those who argue that peace cannot be bartered in exchange for justice, under any circumstances, must be prepared to justify the
likely prolongation of an armed conﬂict” (Report, vol. 3b, §11). This goes in line with the academic visions of the tension between the
two ideals: the pursuit of justice entails the prolongation of hostilities, whereas the pursuit of peace requires resigning oneself to
some injustices” (Manas, 1996, p. 43). In most explicit terms, a war crimes tribunal/court may be seen as “a bargaining chip”
(D’Amato, 1994, p. 503). Prosecution may create a disincentive for peace thus prolonging the atrocities, it is therefore justiﬁed to
consider “the dangerous slippage between peace and justice” (Clarke, 2012, p. 309).
In a widely quoted contribution to Human Rights Quarterly, an anonymous oﬃcial dealt with the distribution of responsibilities:
the task of ending war is deﬁnitely the task of a peace negotiator warned against the latter becoming prosecutor (Anonymous, 1996,
p. 256). The possible variations on the theme include a situation when prosecution serves as a disincentive to negotiations for
negotiators may at the same time fear arrest or prosecution as the accused perpetrators. In that regard, the ICC may be considered
“an unwelcome intrusion of albeit laudable ideals on a terrain that requires some very hard and unpalatable bargains to be driven”
(Gissel, 2015, p. 429). Prosecutions may be considered generally as serving to obstruct or inhibit the possibility of bringing conﬂict to
an end.
On the other hand, the very prospect of negotiations may also induce several positive aspects (Sriram, 2009, p. 306), including
the internationalization of the negotiating context, contribution to short- or medium-term deterrence in respect of ongoing abuses,
as well as identiﬁcation of the negotiation parties and the discussed issues, in particular excluding the possibility of introducing
amnesties (Gissel, 2015, p. 429). In this regard one may speak of a stabilizing eﬀects of the mere threat of the prosecution, in
particular by undermining the power of leaders responsible for the atrocities and their reliability in conducing peace negotiations
(Akhavan, 2009, p. 629). However, this approach may have some drawbacks, for the mere simpliﬁcation of strictly equating
adjudication with justice. It is also diﬃcult to consider those leaders as rational actors. Thus, it may be suggested to discard such a
raw peace-justice binary as it reduces the relationship in question to oversimpliﬁed mechanisms neglecting some justice-providing
quality of peace and the complexity of prosecuting international crimes.
So far the mechanisms of international criminal justice have been created mainly in an ad hoc manner, mostly at the end of
conﬂicts. Now, with the entry into force of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, the situation has
thoroughly changed. The present position goes in line with that of the Secretary-General expressed in the report on “The rule of law
and transitional justice in conﬂict and post-conﬂict societies”. While considering the ICC as “the most signiﬁcant recent development
in the international community's long struggle to advance the cause of justice and rule of law”, the Secretary-General underlined
already in the summary that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing
imperatives. Advancing all three in fragile post-conﬂict settings requires strategic planning, careful integration and sensible
sequencing of activities”. It was also suggested to “adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to the rule of law and
transitional justice, including proper sequencing and timing for implementation of peace processes, transitional justice processes,
electoral processes and other transitional processes”. Further in the report, it was clariﬁed that “Justice and peace are not
contradictory forces. Rather, when properly pursued, they promote and sustain one another. The question, then, can never be
whether to pursue justice and accountability, but rather when and how” (Secretary-General, 2004, §21, p. 8).
This paper also proposes to take a holistic view to transcend the divide in question. There have been already some detailed
scholarly examination of the impact of prosecuting speciﬁc leaders, such as Kony or al Bashir on peace processes (see, e.g. Clarke,
2012; Oette, 2010). The limits of the present analysis do not allow for repeating those considerations. Instead, out of the options
available under the Rome Statute we shall ﬁrst consider the deferral under Article 16 and then move on to analyse the issue through
the lens of prosecutorial discretion. In addition, several other alternative devices which may address the peace versus justice debate
will be also discussed from a more general perspective.
2. The goals of international criminal justice
In broader terms, the potential conﬂict between peace and justice may be seen as yet another reﬂection of the debate on the goals
(and means) of international criminal justice. Given the still scarce practice of the permanent ICC it is necessary to pay attention to
the respective jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. Notwithstanding the diﬀerences between those judicial institutions,
the main choice has always been between retribution and deterrence.
Perhaps one of the best references to retribution in the context of international criminal justice was made in Nicolić when it was
understood as “recognition of the harm and suﬀering caused to the victims” and “a clear statement by the international community
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that crimes will be punished and impunity will not prevail” (ICTY, 2003, §§ 86–7).
In the Celebici judgment, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia discarded
retribution as the one and only goal of international criminal justice. According to the Trial Chamber, the theory of retribution, being
rooted in the primitive theory of revenge, when being used as the only factor in sentencing is likely to be counterproductive and
disruptive of the entire purpose of the restoration and maintenance of peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly,
retributive punishment by itself does not bring justice (ICTY, 1998, §1231). Instead, the Trial Chamber clearly favoured deterrence
(calling it probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian
law) (at §1234).
To put the problem in perhaps too blunt terms, retribution, against this particular background, would favour “blind justice”,
whereas deterrence seems to contribute more to the achievement of peace. Still, it is impossible to consider simply and exclusively,
the one and only aim of international criminal prosecution. There are several other goals, which go hand in hand. Reliance on
identiﬁcation or singling out only one of them to determine the outcome of the analyzed troubled relationship would be counter-
productive. There are, of course, also other objectives of prosecuting international crimes, like rehabilitation of oﬀenders,
establishing the historical report or the post-conﬂict reconciliation, to mention but few of them.
In broader terms, one may consider another dilemma between retributive and restorative justice. The latter, as contrasted with
the traditional understanding relying on culpability, is based on accountability and paying more attention to the relationships among
oﬀenders, victims and their communities. This was perfectly what the Secretary General meant when, while honoring the Geneva
Conventions, he mentioned “The debate on how to “reconcile” peace and justice or how to “sequence” them has lasted more than a
decade. Today, we have achieved a conceptual breakthrough: the debate is no longer between peace and justice but between peace
and what kind of justice” (Secretary-General, 2009).
3. The deferral
One of the most obvious reﬂections of the tension under consideration would be a blunt juxtaposition of the respective mandates
of the International Criminal Court and the Security Council. The latter's involvement in addressing international crimes is nothing
new – suﬃce here to mention that both ad hoc international criminal tribunals (for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively)
were created as subsidiary by the Council, which had used its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. There exists a
critical link between combating impunity and maintaining international peace and security (Kirsch, Holmes, & Johnson, 2004, p.
281). Accordingly, international crimes constitute, at the very least, a threat to international peace and security and therefore they
may be addressed by the Security Council.
The permanent ICC enjoys a separate, independent status being created by means of an international treaty. Yet, the Rome
Statute addresses several functions to be exercised by the Security Council - ranging from the special role with regard to the crime of
aggression, via referral, to the enforcement powers (Krzan, 2009, pp. 65ﬀ.). Against the particular background scrutinized here, it is
the power to defer proceedings under Article 16 that needs to be paid special attention to. According to the said provision, “No
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that eﬀect; that
request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions”.
However, it would be too simple to consider the ICC merely a tool of justice and, respectively, the main political organ of the
United Nations as the sole representation of the interests of peace. The permanent Court is independent in relationship with the
United Nations system but bound with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Preamble of the Rome
Statute, paras. 7 and 9). Thereby, both the UN and the ICC share common values. This reaﬃrmation in the Rome Statute of the
Charter principles seem to justify the opinion that the Statute is ‘a supplement to the UN Charter’ (Tomuschat, 1998, p. 337).
Furthermore, the Preamble of the Statute recognises (at paragraph 3) the instrumental critical link that grave crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world. Such a wording might, as envisaged by some authors,
provide the Security Council with an ‘open-ended license to meddle’ (Elaraby, 2001, p. 45). Opinions of that kind seem exaggerated
although it is a fact that the Court might be regarded as a very valuable instrument at the disposal of the Council in its
responsibilities to maintain international peace and security (Kirsch et al., 2004, p. 290). Similarly, during the debate in the Security
Council, the President of the ICC Sang-Hyun Song recognized that “While the ICC's contribution is through justice, not peacemaking,
its mandate is highly relevant to peace as well. The Rome Statute is based on the recognition that the grave crimes with which it deals
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world. The Statute's objective is […] laying the foundation for a sustainable peace”
(UN Doc. S/PV.6849, p. 4).
Correlating the acts of the permanent ICC with those of the Council is problematic, especially if one takes into consideration that
a price for achievement of peace may be high. The Council may well decide that the saving of lives resulting from peace accords is
more important that prosecution of the perpetrators of the most serious international crimes. For these reasons it was clear for the
drafters of the Statute of the projected ICC that a respective provision should be included. Despite being regarded one of the most
dangerous and sensitive provisions in the ICC Statute (El Zeidy, 2002, p. 1509), Article 16 of the Rome Statute can be regarded as
the vehicle for resolving conﬂicts between the requirements of peace and justice where, in the view of the Security Council, the peace
eﬀorts need to prevail over international criminal justice (Bergsmo & Pelić, 1999, p. 378). Some serious problems regarding the
selectivity and political control might however result from it.
It is the application of the said provision in practice that merits special scrutiny. Initially, the resolutions were adopted under the
threat that the US would not participate in UN peacekeeping operations unless granted immunity from the jurisdiction of the ICC
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(Krzan, 2009). The whole series of the UN SC actions started with the unanimously adopted resolution 1422, providing for the
suspension from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court the members of peacekeeping troops. Surprisingly enough, it
implicated that jurisdiction of the ICC over peacekeepers from states which were not parties to the Rome Statute may constitute a
threat to international peace and security. Arguably, however, should the ICC jurisdiction be a threat to international peace and
security in general then the exemption given by a resolution should be much broader in its scope, not limited to peacekeepers from
non-parties.
Resolution 1422 did in fact create a bad precedence. It called for a renewal for further 12-month period. A new discussion within
the Council began in June 2003 resulting in resolution 1487 whose text was identical with that of its predecessor.
Soon thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1497 concerning peace support mission in Liberia and without
mentioning Article 16 decided not a suspension but practically a total exclusion of the ICC jurisdiction for ‘current or former oﬃcials
or personnel from a contributing State, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, […] for all
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to the Multinational Force or United Nations stabilization force in Liberia’ over an
indeﬁnite period of time.
Another attempt to renew the suspension was made in May 2004 but eventually abandoned because of the devastating impact of
the resolution 1497 that could be regarded as a factor preventing the states from adopting another resolution in such a manner. The
lack of support for deferral resolutions could also be, at least to some extent, explained with reference to the situation in the Abu
Ghraib prison (Abbas, 2005, p. 265; Zappalà, 2003, p. 677).
Apart from merely suspending or, in the worst cases, excluding the ICC jurisdiction, one needs also to take note of the Security
Council's referrals of the situation in Darfur or in Libya. Neither Resolution 1593(2005) nor Resolution 1970(2011) relied on the
referral's actual legal basis, i.e. Article 13 of the Rome Statute, but instead explicitly mentioned Article 16. Be that as it may, both
Resolutions decided, again as in Resolution 1497, that oﬃcials or personnel from a contributing state not party to the Rome Statute
should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State. The practice has shown that instead of immunizing
individual leaders, the Security Council has chosen to oﬀer general deferral.
Some additional light on Article 16 has been also shed by further unsuccessful attempts by the African Union to defer the ICC
investigation into the situation in Darfur. After the Prosecutor applied for the arrest warrant for al Bashir on 14 July 2008 the
African Union Peace and Security Council requested a one-year deferral by the UN Security Council based on the procedure provided
by the Rome Statute (PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII), Rev.1). The request met with no positive response by the Court, to the regret of the
African Union, which formally decided not to cooperate with the ICC for the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese President
(Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, § 10).
In a similar vein the Court disregarded Kenya's request that the Security Council defer the Court's investigations into the 2007-8
postelection violence. Several proposals by the African Union Assembly produced no expected results. A draft resolution on the
Kenya deferral request (UN Doc. S/2013/660) was voted in the Security Council in Mid-November 2013 and received only seven
aﬃrmative votes (UN Doc. S/PV.7060).
Additionally, one may also refer to attempts to invoke Article 16 in the context of the investigations into Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire
and the Central African Republic (Mistry & Ruiz Verduzco, 2012, p. 15). Now, these attempts are accompanied by the
announcements of the intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute (so far by Burundi, South Africa or Gambia).
Finally, one needs to mention the controversies surrounding the amendment of Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The mentioned
controversies around the arrest warrant for the President of Sudan stirred up a proposal by African states to amend this provision
which relied on the disputable Uniting for Peace formula. Accordingly, where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request
by the state with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting Party
may request the UN General Assembly to assume the Security Council's responsibility (ICC-ASP/10/32. Annex V). Such a proposal is
yet another reﬂection of the controversial character of the Article 16. The chances for adopting the proposed amendment seem
limited. It is to be expected that Article 16 remains one of the most problematic provisions.
4. The role of the Prosecutor and the interests of justice
Apart from looking at the problem from an external perspective (by including the UN organ), it is inevitable to analyse the ICC's
internal mechanisms to compromise the demands of peace. The ﬁnancial resources of the Court, and consequently those of the Oﬃce
of the Prosecutor, are not unlimited and the budget does not allow to investigate and prosecute every crime potentially within the
ICC jurisdiction. Therefore, the Prosecutor may exercise his/her discretion at diﬀerent stages of the proceedings: when deﬁning a
situation, initiating the investigation and halting a prosecution, after an investigation has begun. It is thus the Prosecutor that must
diplomatically manage tension between the pursuit of peace and the pursuit of justice (Mnookin, 2013).
Crucial in that regard is Article 53 of the Rome Statute, which encompasses considerations that may lead the Prosecutor not to
proceed with the investigation of a situation if an investigation “would not serve the interests of justice”.
The very phrase is open to diﬀerent, sometimes diverging interpretations. After the ceremony of sworning in, the ﬁrst ICC
Prosecutor mentioned the need to take into account the existing interdependence of other important institutions and governmental
organisations dedicated to the enhancement of the rule of law, humanitarian assistance and conﬂict resolution and also noted that
“the ICC is independent and interdependent at the same time. It cannot act alone. It will achieve eﬃciency only if it works closely
with other members of the international community”. This formulation levelled some strong criticism.
The subsequently issued (September 2003) ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor’ did not refer to the
demands of peace. Instead, while mentioning the limited resources of the Court, it was underlined that the Oﬃce would function
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with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity. Beside initiating prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the
crimes, the OTP should namely “encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with
the international community to ensure that the oﬀenders are brought to justice by some other means”. It is the latter phrase that
opens a ﬂoor for further considerations of other available options. However, those options would be most available only to “other
perpetrators”, i.e. not the main political or military leaders. For those other oﬀenders, as later stated, “alternative means for
resolving the situation may be necessary, whether by international assistance in strengthening or rebuilding the national justice
systems concerned, or by some other means” (OTP, 2003, p. 3).
In his second report to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) of 13 December 2005, Luis Moreno Occampo
announced that in considering whether a prosecution is not in the interests of justice, the Prosecutor would “follow the various
national and international eﬀorts to achieve peace and security, as well as the views of witnesses and victims of the crimes” (OTP,
2005, p. 6).
Such a position was subsequently rejected in another report of 2007. In the Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, the
Prosecutor underlined a diﬀerence between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of peace, the latter falling “within
the mandate of institutions other than the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor”. As a preliminary conclusion, the OTP considered the issue of the
interests of justice, as reﬂected in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, to be one of the most complex aspects of that treaty (OTP, 2007, p.
2). With regard to other justice mechanisms the Oﬃce reiterated the need to integrate diﬀerent approaches, which may be
complementary. Accordingly, domestic prosecutions, truth seeking, reparations programs, institutional reform and traditional
justice mechanisms may play a role in the pursuit of a broader justice and in addressing the impunity gap (OTP, 2007, p. 8). The
subparagraph devoted to peace processes starts with the general statement that “[t]he ICC was created on the premise that justice is
an essential component of a stable peace”. Having referred to the Preamble to the Rome Statute recognizing that the crimes under
the Court's jurisdiction threaten the peace, security and well‐being of the world the Prosecutor nevertheless pointed that the concept
of the interests of justice “should not be conceived of so broadly as to embrace all issues related to peace and security”. The said
concept established in the Statute, “while necessarily broader than criminal justice in a narrow sense, must be interpreted in
accordance with the objects and purposes of the Statute”.
The most important part of this statement is the recognition of other comprehensive solutions. Particular attention was paid to
the role of the Security Council and its power to defer the proceedings before the ICC under Art. 16 of the Rome Statute. But any
respective action by the Security Council does not absolve, so the Report, of the obligation of the Prosecutor to take into account the
interests of justice under Article 53. In most explicit terms it was indicated that “the broader matter of international peace and
security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other institutions” (OTP, 2007, p. 9).
Given the objectives of the Court (to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the most serious crimes do not go unpunished),
according to the position of the OTP presented in the report, “a decision not to proceed on the basis of the interests of justice should
be understood as a course of last resort”. Conversely, the ‘interests of justice’ might be considered exceptional in nature. The Paper
might be said to set out a general presumption in favour of investigations and prosecutions. The conditions mentioned are also very
abstract in nature and “divorced from application in particular cases. They do not provide a closed/exhaustive system of elements to
be taken into consideration and is, as vigorously mentioned by Ohlin, “completely skeletal” for they do not even address the
relationship with the Security Council (Ohlin, 2009, p. 201).
The most troubling aspect of the Policy Paper is the impression that the Prosecutor chose justice to the exclusion of peace, as
“either/or choice” (Mnookin, 2013, p. 158). Of course, the value of the Policy Paper is not to be overestimated. The position oﬀered
by the OTP is not legally binding – it does not represent any of the judicial arms but only the vision of the (current) OTP and might
be withdrawn or changed if situation so requires. In any case, it contains important information even if the formula under art 53
concerning the interests of justice should be linked to justice in a speciﬁc case (Stahn, 2005, p. 718). Perhaps the future prosecutors
might change the position and adopt a more nuanced one accepting the possibility of balancing the interests of justice with peace in a
diﬀerent manner enabling their accommodation.
The negative position towards the consideration of the interests of peace did also ﬁnd its reﬂection in the 2009 Regulations of the
Oﬃce of the Prosecutor. Against this particular background, one needs to underline that the project of Regulations of 2003 referred
to a potential elements of the deﬁnition of what may constitute “interests of justice” in a footnote appended to Regulation 12
concerning the decision to start or not to start investigation. Accordingly, the experts were not in a position to make a
recommendation on whether the Regulations should contain a detailed deﬁnition, but should that be the case, the deﬁnition could
comprise the following factors: (a) the start of an investigation would exacerbate or otherwise destabilise a conﬂict situation; (b) the
start of an investigation would seriously endanger the successful completion of a reconciliation or peace process; or (c) the start of an
investigation would bring the law into disrepute (Draft regulations, 2003). Such formulation may be objected and it indeed met with
strong criticism from various actors. In the Policy Paper: the meaning of “The Interests of Justice” in Article 53 of the Rome Statute,
Human Rights Watch objected against viewing “considerations of peace and stability to be appropriate considerations under Article
53”. The Policy paper contained also own recommendations for the respective regulations where it explicitly stated that “A decision
whether or not to initiate an investigation or proceed to trial must not be inﬂuenced by: a. possible political advantage or
disadvantage to the government or any political party, group or individual; b. possible media or community reaction to the decision”
(HRW, 2005). As mentioned earlier, the eventually adopted Regulations contain no reference to considerations of peace and could
thus be of no help in addressing the demands of practice.
Some valuable light on the issue in question is shed by the positions taken by the leading oﬃcials of the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor.
In a Key note address at the Seminar organized by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), in Pretoria, on 10 October 2012. Fatou
Bensouda conﬁrmed that the “interests of justice” must not be confused with the interests of peace and security, which falls within
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the mandate of other institutions, notably the UN Security Council and the African Union. In advancing her argument Bensouda
argued that the Court and the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor itself were not involved in political considerations since they had to respect
legal limits. Consequently, “[t]he prospect of peace negotiations is therefore not a factor that forms part of the Oﬃce's determination
on the interests of justice” (Bensouda, 2012). Referring to the Court's experience parallel to conﬂict management and often speciﬁc
peace negotiations, the Prosecutor mentioned the important role the arrest warrants played role in bringing the LRA to the
negotiating table in the Juba Peace Process. On the other hand, however, with regard to Joseph Kony, Bensouda mentioned perverse
side-eﬀects from deferring judicial proceedings in the name of peace and security. Succumbing to pressure to restrain justice may
send out a message to perpetrators that arrest warrants can be stayed if only they commit more crimes or threaten regional peace
and security. Court proceedings or the possibility of Security Council deferrals should not be used by alleged war criminals as a tool
to divide the international community.
In the almost parallel conducted Open Debate of the United Nations Security Council on “Peace and Justice, with a special focus
on the role of the International Criminal Court”, Mr. Phakiso Mochochoko, then Director of the ICC's Jurisdiction, Complementarity
and Cooperation Division, spoke of “no dilemma or contradiction between peace and justice”. According to his position, “The role of
the ICC has never precluded or put an end to such processes; in some cases, it has even encouraged them. The policy of the Oﬃce is
to pursue its independent mandate to investigate and prosecute those few most responsible, and to do so in a manner that respects
the mandates of others and seeks to maximize the positive impact of the joint eﬀorts of all. To pursue its judicial mandate and
preserve its impartiality, the Oﬃce cannot participate in peace initiatives, but it will inform the political actors of its actions in
advance, so that they can factor investigations into their activities (UN Doc. S/PV.6849, p. 7).
Overall, one may note a change in the Prosecutor's position towards the interests of peace. Human rights are best promoted not
by compromising justice in the interests of peace, but by applying criminal law even-handedly (Rodman, 2009, p. 112).
Undoubtedly, requiring the Prosecutor of the ICC to make prosecutorial decisions based on political factors, taking into account
such far-reaching political imperatives as peace and security, would undermine both the perception and reality of the Prosecutor as
an independent organ beyond political inﬂuence (Peschke, 2011, p. 199).
Needless to say, the impact of prosecution on peace is diﬃcult to assess. International criminal justice may of course have
destabilizing consequences on consolidating post-conﬂict peace. The prosecution may have the purported impact in exacerbating
intercommunal divisions and impeding reconciliation (Rodman, 2011, p. 824; Rodman, 2014). Much depends on an individual
strategy adopted to a concrete situation, not only by the Prosecutor, but also, even more importantly, by the Court itself.
As observed by the Pre-Trial Chamber I, article 53(2) of the Statute does not provide for a deﬁnition of the expression “interests
of justice”. It only refers by way of example to some issues which are part of the notion of interests of justice” (PTC, 2009, § 17).
Relying on that, the ICC concluded (at §18) that the Prosecution had been granted by the States Parties discretion in this regard and
that one of the factors that the Prosecution must take into consideration is whether proceeding would be detrimental to the interests
of justice (§18). In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber alluded to the fact that the States Parties had not established in the Statute or in
the Rules a closed list of criteria, according to which the Prosecution must exercise its discretion.
As underlined in the Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor's decision not to initiate an
investigation of 16 July 2015, “The prosecutorial discretion expresses itself only in paragraph (c) of Art. 53(1), i.e. in the Prosecutor's
evaluation of whether the opening of an investigation would not serve the interests of justice (PTC I, 2015, § 14). Against this
particular background it is also worth noting, as the Pre-Trial Chamber II did in its Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya of 31 March 2010, that “Unlike sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), which require an aﬃrmative ﬁnding, sub-paragraph (c) does not require the Prosecutor to establish that an
investigation is actually in the interests of justice. Indeed, the Prosecutor does not have to present reasons or supporting material in
this respect” (PTC II, 2010, § 63 and fn. 35 to § 24). Without doubt, a prosecution could threaten to derail peace negotiations or deter
tyrants from relinquishing power.
Given the hitherto judicial practice it may be too early to assess the overall mutual impact of peace considerations and the
prosecution of international crimes.
5. Other devices for compromising the values
To take the interests of justice into account is directly linked with other considerations also relevant in terms of our dilemma.
Obviously, the Court may declare the proceedings inadmissible under Article 17 or simply refer to the principle ne bis in idem under
article 20 and thus defer the proceedings as well. When discussing the issue of complementarity, the point was made that the ICC
should only exercise its jurisdiction in the aftermath of the conﬂict, due to scarcity of resources and potential bias, when expecting
the cooperation from one part of the conﬂict (Razesberger, 2006, p. 186). The relevance of the stability in a given territory is of
course beyond question for the proper exercise of criminal jurisdiction. But any unconditional acceptance of such a proposal would
mean that the whole prosecution would have to wait until the peace process is completed. This brings the issue of proper sequencing.
Accordingly, one may try to circumvent the potential clash between the values by pursuing a sequential approach, i.e. by
concentrating on peace agreement ﬁrst and only later on to start addressing the “justice issue”. However, it has to be borne in mind
that peace and justice do not necessarily follow a linear peace-the-justice trajectory (Moreno-Ocampo, 2006, p. 498). International
prosecutions may also have the eﬀect of obliterating the local incentives to negotiate, in consequence prolonging the conﬂict (Grono
& O’Brien, 2008, p. 15). Still, it would be rather strange, to expect that an operation of a judicial institution is to depend to such an
extent on the outcome of peace talks.
From such a perspective, the ICC might be seen “not just as a challenge to impunity, but also as a potential challenge or
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impediment to peace negotiations and agreements” (Sriram, 2009, p. 305). This is especially true in case of amnesties, that rely on
the assumption that they are more conductive to long-term peace and stability than criminal trials, which could create new tensions
and friction (Clark, 2011, p. 539). In other words, amnesty trades justice for peace. This has been the case of Latin America and
South Africa. Deﬁnitely, there is a danger that peace deals sacriﬁcing justice may eventually fail to produce peace, as evidenced e.g.
by the violent aftermath of Foday Sankoh after the failed amnesty agreement in Sierra Leone (Grono & O’Brien, 2008, p. 18).
However, it may be claimed that justice, in the form of prosecution, must take priority over peace and national reconciliation
(Dugard, 2002, p. 702), which goes in line with the prevailing view of inadmissibility of amnesties. Altogether, it reduces the practical
importance of amnesties as means for addressing the dichotomy between peace and justice.
The question of the compatibility of the two concepts and the potential sequence between them could take another form, i.e. the
one encompassed in a formula: Peace via justice. Peace might be brought through justice, but one should be aware of the danger that
thereby the ICC's integrity as an impartial instrument of justice may be undermined (Kerr, 2007, p. 383). Be that as it may, the
traditional understanding of peace is getting expanded and would probably need some further examination, which is beyond the
scope of present considerations.
6. Concluding remarks
Even a cursory (as the present one) outlook at the analyzed topic provokes some at least interim conclusions to be drawn. First of
all, generally, peace and justice are inextricably connected. International peace and international criminal justice are not mutually
exclusive. Their promotion, despite being complex and tricky, should be attempted at since the former cannot be completely
achieved at the cost of the latter and vice versa. Both values reinforce and complement each other. The need of peace can and should
be accommodated with demands of justice. However, if handled improperly, the two may clash. Yet, the facilitation of peace may not
be equated to an acceptance of impunity.
Despite diﬀerent numerous problems the ICC may be and is ready to face the dilemma mentioned in the title to this paper. The
Court may use diﬀerent numerous means to provide justice, its record may also reveal additional impacts on peace, much depending
on speciﬁc decisions. Hence, numerous theoretical debates notwithstanding, it is for the International Criminal Court, through its
growing jurisprudence, as well as for the Oﬃce of Prosecutor, to answer but above all to newly deﬁne the peace vs. justice question.
The eventual result depends also on a number of external factors including the respective position of States and other actors. In
the latter regard the hitherto practice of the United Nations Security Council and the growing opposition from the African Union is of
particular importance.
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